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INTELLECTIONS. 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. 
BY MAJOR J. W. POWELL. 
ASTREAM of judgments flows through the mind. As the ego has self-activity it changes its position in the environment at 
will and a different environment plays on the senses at every 
change in the position of the ego. Then by different senses the en-
vironment solicits the attention simultaneously by all. Thus atten-
tion is solicited by more sense impressions than it can attend to, 
and it chooses for attention those which serve a temporary or more 
sustained purpose. Those serving a temporary purpose give rise 
to what has been called by Kant, the practical reason; those serv-
ing a sustained purpose, the pure reason. 
Presentative judgments that originate in sense impressions, 
are often followed by representative judgments, and these are 
either discursive or volitional. Hence we see that the judgments 
which we make are exceedingly multitudinous and heterogeneous. 
But all these judgments are assembled in concepts by more tempo-
rary or more permanent purposes. What judgments can be made 
are determined by the environment; but what judgments the mind 
selects to make are determined by the purpose. Thus the ego is 
the creature of environment and self-activity. The stream of judg-
ments is thought, and thought is controlled by self-activity and en-
vironment. 
It may be well to further consider the process of combining 
judgments by reflexion. 
I am wandering by the river. Why should the river here sud-
denly pass from a narrow gorge to a wide-spread plain and be 
transformed from a narrow to an expansive stream? And why 
should the turbulent waters above become so quiet below? 
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I climb a rock to study the problem. The bluffs standing back 
from the river converge at this point and seem as if they would 
join hands across the chasm through which the river plunges. 
Here the bluff is a cliff and the edges of sandstone strata outcrop 
in the escarpment, and I observe with care the succession of rocks 
from the bottom to the top of the cliff. But a robin flies down and 
perches on a willow near by, and in a instant cliff and geology van-
ish from my thought; I see a turkis egg and a nest in the apple-
tree of my garden, !lnd my daughter is shouting a song of childish 
joy in my mind's ear, for this she did not many weeks ago. In 
thought I am at home once more. Then home vanishes and I see 
the robin again flitting from bough to bough, and as it moves my 
eyes follow it until it is in a line between myself and the cliff, and 
the sight of the cliff brings back my geologic problem. I see the 
red sandstone below, the brown shales between and the white 
sandstones above, and recognise the succession as being similar to 
one seen before. If so, the summit of the cliff must be crowned 
by a: limestone. Yes, there is the limestone with its angular out-
lines, in contrast with the round reliefs of the sandstone. I am one 
step farther in my problem. I put the facts of the succession to-
gether and say this is a carboniferous cliff. I know these rocks. 
In climbing I hear a noise. In an instant I interpret it as the 
voice of a friend, and, turning about, find I am right. I hasten to 
announce my discovery, but he holds a flower aloft, waving it in 
triumph. That wand banishes the cliff with its succession of beds 
from my mind, and I see a bluebell drooping from its delicate stem 
and ringing a chime of cerulean beauty. In a twinkling of an eye 
my mind travels a thousand miles, and I am climbing the gray 
sandstone cliff which rises in the midst of the valley of Illinois 
River and is known as "Starved Rock." The miles my soul has 
travelled are only equaled by the time over which it has returned. 
I am a young man again, and I burst into a song: 
" Its rare to see the morning bleeze 
Like a bonfire frae the sea." 
Why do I sing that song? It was on my tongue when I found 
my first bluebell on "Starved Rock." 
My friend bids me follow him. At one moment I am thinking 
of the cove, at another I am listening to the voice of my friend, 
and at still another I am watching the way over which we walk; 
and now and then my mind wandefB away home and where not. 
Now my attention is attracted to a footprint in the sand. From its 
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shape I know it was made by a deer. Thus I make an inference 
beyond my perception. The track is the sign of something else. 
I see other tracks; they are arranged along our course in pairs 
several feet apart. By this arrangement I infer that the deer was 
leaping, as if fleeing from danger, and I imagine that the deer has 
been startled at our approach. This is an erroneous inference, for 
my friend tells me that he roused the deer as he came down the 
path some time ago. And as we still walk I study the rocks, and 
discover that a limestone forms the floor of tbe valley below; and 
then I discover by its contained fossils that it is the same forma-
tion as the one which crosses the summit of the cliff. The valley 
limestone was broken from the cliff limestone and dropped down by 
what geologists call a fault, and the fall or throw of the fault is 
more than a thousand feet. And now I discover the origin of the 
cascades in the canyon above and the broad and quiet flow of the 
river below. The last dropping of the sandstone by the fault de-
creased the declivity of the stream in the valley and increased the 
declivity of the stream above the valley, where it comes down 
through the canyon. All this is reasoning. It is a series of judg-
ments controlled by will for a course of reasoning on a theme for 
which I have a permanent interest, interrupted by a multitude of 
adventitious judgments that are made by reason of temporary in-
terest. 
We sit down by the spring and my friend spreads the lunch 
on a fallen tree trunk, and away goes my mind to the bank of the 
Grand River in central Colorado, and I see a prostrate pine, and 
an emerald lake near by, and on the shore, cliffs of granite, and 
beyond, a snow-clad mountain, and about its summit the gathered 
clouds, and the sheen of clouds and snow-fields blends with 
stretches of forest and crags and peaks of towering grandeur. 
Years ago I was there, and the feast on this log brings back the 
feast on that log, with its attendant glories of mountain scenery. 
From that scene I am called back by the bidding of my friend to 
eat. Then a bird comes down to the fountain, and I am engaged 
in watching its coy advances to the water. And so my mind passes 
instantaneously from one object to another-now engaged in ob-
serving things present, now listening to the voice of my friend, 
now occupied in expressing my thought to him, now calling up 
some scene from afar; but ever thinking. On goes the stream of 
thought. 
I eat of the turnover, and observe from the taste that it is made 
of blackberries; and then I think of the blackberry patches over 
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which I strayed in childhood on the hills of Southern Ohio, and of 
my companion, Charles Isham, who was killed at the battle of Shi-
loh. And I talk of battles, till my friend speaks of bread and but-
ter. Thirst causes me to go to the spring, and I quaff from its 
crystal fountain, and listen to the jests hurled at me by my friend, 
and laugh at his wit. Still on goes the stream of thought. 
We have eaten the lunch and gathered the plants, and return 
home. On the way a sharp, buzzing sound thrills me with horror. 
I know it as the warning of a rattlesnake. It is a familiar sound to 
me, for I have found many of these serpents in the wilderness. I 
look about, and there it is, coiled in the grass. With my cane I 
strike it a blow, and then another, until it stretches its length on 
the ground, dead. From the inanimate reptile I pluck the rattles. 
There are nine on its tail, which it was wont to ring when danger 
approached-discordant bells whose ringing is a symbol to the 
woodsman that reptilian hell is lurking near the pathway. 
We have reached the river bank, and separate; I climb about 
it in search of fossils. Soon I discover carboniferous fossils in the 
rock at the foot of the cliff, and climbing up beside the stream I 
discover limestone rocks which have come down from the summit 
of the cliff, and see the same fossils. My explanation of the origin 
of the cliff, the rapid descent of the river from above, the narrow 
channel through which it runs, the valley below, and the broad ex-
panse of quiet water, is verified. Now, in my reasoning about the 
fall of a river into a quiet reach, I used concepts of form in the na-
ture of the channel, and concepts of form in the structure of the 
rocks. I also used concepts of time in the succession of the rocks, 
and I reached a conclusion or judgment as to the cause of the rapid 
which was a judgment of causation, and I confirmed this judgment 
by reaching the same conclusion from the story of the fossils that 
I had reached from the story of the geological structure; so con-
cepts verify concepts. On careful examination it will always be 
found that judgments of causation are verified by the congruence 
of concepts. 
The stream of thought is composed of a series of widely di-
verse elements, or mentations, that are judgments, all differing 
among themselves. Now, it is impossible for the mind to dwell on 
anyone of these elements. You cannot think of a scratch long; 
the mind immediately passes to something else-another sight or 
sound. Consciousness, which is awareness of a change in self, is 
the absolute, the independent of thought and that on which infer-
ences are founded; and consciousness is awareness of a succession 
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of impulses on self or by self, that flow with the rapidity of thought 
that seems almost to vie with the rapidity of air collisions in sound. 
Hence consciousness is serial, and inferences are serial, and judg-
ments are necessarily serial; but thought must go on. Gaze into 
the eye of my lady and think of its sapphirine hue; in a moment 
you think of something else-the sable curtain, the coy glance, 
perchance the cerulean heaven, or the deep blue sea. It is impos-
sible to hold your mind for more than a moment on the blueness of 
the eye; the thought must go on. But on to what? is the ques-
tion. Tell me in the case of any individual the laws which govern 
the procession of his thought, and I will tell his name, be it sage 
or fool. There is always a nexus between contiguous elements 
in the stream of thought. Sometimes it is mere adventitious asso-
clatlOn. The thing seen or heard has at some previous time been 
associated with something else. The touch is associated with the 
mother's stroke on childish curls; the taste of that particular fruit 
is associated with an occasion of joy; the perfume of smoke is as-
sociated with the burning forest;; the song is associated with some 
scene of glee; the robin is associated with the cottage home. But 
the nexus of association is not always adventitious. It is often con-
trolled by an established design. With the fool, adventitious rela-
tion is the principal nexus of thought in the procession; with the 
sage, logical relation is the chief nexus. 
The links of relation in the chain of thought are not always 
apparent to the thinker himself. Steps in the procession of reason-
ing are often cancelled; the mind passes, by great bounds, from 
one to another. When the steps in the course of logical reasoning 
have been taken many times, the mind finds it unnecessary to 
tread the ground again and again, with slow and measured pace, 
but it springs from point to point, and the greater reasoners make 
the greater leaps. This is a fact well known to scientific men, but 
it gives to the procession of mentations those characteristics which 
cause the greatest wonder to men, and which have led to many of 
the errors of psychology. 
By reflecting on the past and comparing it with the present, 
we prophesy of the future and often our prophecies are confirmed. 
By day we prophesy of the night, and the night comes; at night 
we prophesy of the morning, and the morning comes. As the days, 
weeks, months, and years, go by, we learn by experience of the 
changes wrought in self and infer changes yet to be wrought. By 
experience we discover the changes wrought in others, and by in-
ference jUdgments are formed of changes yet to be wrought. It is 
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by experience that we learn of all the changes in environment. 
The skies change; the seasons change; the river was low yester-
day, it is a raging torrent to-day. The acorn bourgeons with leaf-
lets, it sends rootlets into the earth and stem and branch into the 
air; it grows from week to week, month to month, year to year, 
and under our experience it becomes a tree. The child is born, it 
grows to be a lad, a youth, a young man, a vigorous adult, an old 
man, and the judgments formed are compounded into ideas of be-
coming. It is thus by reflexion that a vast multitude of judgments 
are compounded into ideas of the changes wrought by time, and 
reflex ion becomes the special process of cognising metagenesis. 
As on the wings of perception all lands are viewed, so on wings of 
reflexion all times are conned. The illimitable past and the illim-
itable future are all painted on the canvas of now by the artist of 
reflexion. Things that have been and things to be are emblazoned 
on the panorama of reflexional concept. 
Thus we have ideas of sensation or classification, ideas of per-
ception or integration, ideas of understanding or co-operation, and 
ideas of reflexion or history, all derived from the germs of sense 
impression as they have been made on the mind of the individual 
in moments, hours, days, and years. 
A boulder cannot move from the bank into the swift channel in 
order that it may journey down the stream, but a man may travel 
from the distant hill to voyage on the river. The leaf cannot flut-
ter in the air unless the air is sweeping by, and the air cannot 
move as a breeze without antecedent conditions of temperature. 
Every action is self-action and every passion is self-passion, but 
the action of one must have its correlate in the action of another, 
and the passion of one must have its correlate in the passion of an-
other. In this respect animate bodies have a property which 
separates them from inanimate bodies, in that they perform actions 
which are self-directed, and in that they have passions that are 
self-chosen. The animal may choose to enter the current or it may 
choose to expose itself to the wind, and it may act for these pur-
poses by placing itself under the proper conditions. Heretofore 
we have attempted to use the term activity in this sense as a 
chosen act. By such activities design or purpose is expressed. I 
see a bird fly from tree to tree and think of it as an activity 
prompted by design. I see a leaf blown from one tree to another 
and I see an act not determined by choice. All this is intended to 
make clear the distinction between activities and acts and to show 
that activities are manifestations of mind. The inanimate body is 
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conscious of mind, and through the manifestations of mind with 
others it is led to infer that they also have minds. 
In the history of metaphysical philosophy the doctrine of pre-
sentative and representative judgments has undergone some strange 
vicissitudes. The distinction seems first to have been formulated 
by the terms impressions and thoughts, presentative judgments 
being called impressions and representative judgments thoughts. 
Spencer refers to the same distinction when he speaks of vivid im-
pressions and faint impressions. Others have considered present-
ative judgments as instinctive or intuitive, for such judgments are 
often made instantaneously and without apparent consciousness of 
previous judgments. The nature of intuition we have already set 
forth. Kant also believes that representative judgments are con-
trolled by forms of thought pre-existing in the mind and not de-
rived from experience, in which all judgments are moulded. He 
supposes the mind to be endowed with the knowledge of space as 
empty space and of time as empty time, and that the ego fills the 
empty space and empty time with forms of thought. Thus the 
metaphysicians have always failed to discover the nature of a judg-
ment with its pentalogic elements, in which both consciousness 
and choice appear with comparison, which completes the judg-
ment. They also fail to discover that a presentative judgment is 
only initiated by a sense impression, and that the ego must still re-
call past impressions in a concept to make the judgment complete, 
and they also fail to discover that the representative judgment is 
initiated by recalling a past concept and comparing it with another 
concept of past judgments. 
I see a worm crawling on the ground; the worm causes a 
sense impression. I might stop to consider its color and have 
a judgment of sensation, or I might consider its form and have a 
judgment of perception, or I might consider its motion and have a 
judgment of understanding, or I might consider its cause as an egg 
and have a judgment of reflexion, or I might consider that the mo-
tion itself is directed molar motion and hence manifests mind in 
the worm; then I would have a judgment of ideation. Anyone of 
these judgments can be made from the same sense impression, and 
my interest, my purpose, my choice, determines the nature of the 
judgment made. But when made it needs verification. If the 
judgment as a sensation is valid and there is a color, if the judg-
ment of perception is valid and there is a form, if the judgment of 
understanding is valid and there is a motion, if the judgment of 
causation is valid and there is an object developed from an egg, 
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then there is left for consideration the validity of the judgment of 
ideation, for the worm may not be moving by its own volition, but 
it may be dragged by an ant. Its motion must be due to an ani-
mate and designing cause, which may inhere in the worm itself or 
in another which is unknown to me, for it is molar motion caused 
by mind, and in order that I may verify my judgment of mind in 
the worm I must determine that it is living and free to use its own 
judgment; such verification comes only by the comparison of con~ 
cepts. As ideation is the compounding of concepts, so verification 
in ideation is the comparison of concepts. 
In sensation, perception, understanding, and reflexion, con-
cepts are developed by the consolidation of judgments. In idea-
tion we have a faculty by which judgments are added to judgments 
to constitute concepts and which then continues its power of form-
ing judgments by combining concepts with concepts and forever 
forming new concepts thereby, while at the same time the power 
thus developed of comparing concepts with concepts is leading to 
a re-formation of the concepts themselves by the elimination of fal-
lacies, for when concepts by comparison with concepts are found 
to be incongruous, the mind refuses to accept them as valid and 
seeks for the source of error. We must, therefore, discover the 
means by which concepts are compared with concepts. 
We must now shoulder the task of explaining the laws of sym-
bolism or association, which have been assumed from time to time 
and partially explained in this discussion. 
That which I have sometimes called symbolism and that which 
I have sometimes called association are the same thing. When a 
sensation which is the result of a sense impression caused by one 
attribute of a body, is taken as a symbol of the body itself with all 
its attributes, it becomes a symbol of all with which it is asso-
ciated. When a sense impression gives rise to a judgment of force 
it recalls many other judgments of force and thus becomes a sym-
bol of other things. When a judgment of cause is formed it also 
becomes a symbol of other causes. Sense impressions are directly 
used by the mind in this manner in sensation, perception, appre-
hension, reflex ion, and ideation, and it is thus that ideas are pri-
marily associated. The memories of judgments are recalled by 
other judgments, as we have seen, so that not only do judgments 
which arise from sensations recall other judgments, but these other 
judgments recall still other judgments, and thus there is recollec-
tion in the second degree; and these revivals may go on from de-
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gree to degree to an indefinite extent. All of these facts have been 
illustrated. 
As we judge by comparing concepts with other concepts or 
with impressions, one judgment by a faculty is associated with 
other judgments by the same faculty, and as one property is con-
comitant with all the others, one property becomes a symbol of all 
the others, so that there is association by comparison of concepts 
and association by symbolism. Hence all our judgments are asso-
ciated. 
The quantitative properties are the reciprocals of the categoric 
properties, for the one is the reciprocal of the many which com-
pose the one. The one is a kind, and the many is another kind, 
and the one kind is the reciprocal of the many kinds. So the one 
form of the body is the reciprocal of the many extensions of the 
particles. The one motion of the body is the reciprocal of the 
many motions of the particles, hence the one force of the body 
is the reciprocal of the many motions of the particles, for the 
force of the body is the reciprocal of the motion of the parti-
cles. The one time of the body is the reciprocal of the many times 
of a particle, hence the one causation of the body is the reciprocal 
of the many times of the particles. The one judgment of the body 
is the reciprocal of the many judgments of the particles, hence the 
one concept of the body is the reciprocal of the many judgments of 
the particles. 
Judgments of quantitative bodies are reciprocal judgments of 
classific bodies, hence they are associated by reciprocality. Judg-
ments of one property are concomitants with judgments of another 
property, therefore they are associated by concomitancy. Now 
judgments associated by concomitancy are often intuitive in the 
sense in which that term is used here; so judgments associated by 
reciprocality are often intuitive. But there are many judgments 
that are associated not by concomitancy or reciprocality, because 
they are chosen when we make judgments; of those chosen some 
are volitional, some discursive. The discursive associations are 
those usually recognised as such, and again we have association by 
kind or likeness, by form, by force, by causation, and by concept. 
Thus it is that the ego remembers by pentalogic properties. Thus 
association is the law of memory. 
Units are associated with units, numbers with numbers, kinds 
with kinds, series with series, classes with classes, and all are as-
sociated in nature and considered in classification. Then exten-
sions are associated with extensions, spaces with spaces, forms 
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with forms, metamorphoses with metamorphoses, organisms with 
organisms, and all these are interassociated and these associations 
are considered in morphology. Then speeds are associated with 
speeds, motions with motions, forces with forces, energies with 
energies, powers with powers, co-operations with co-operations, 
and all of these modes of motion are interrelated or associated and 
all are considered in dynamics. Again persistencies are associated 
with persistencies, times with times, causations with causations, 
metageneses with metageneses, developments with developments, 
and they are all interrelated and considered in evolution. Finally, 
sensations are associated with sensations, perceptions with percep-
tions, apprehensions with apprehensions, refiexions with refiexions, 
and ideations with ideations, and all are considered in intellection 
and are represented by words. Then numbers, spaces, motions, 
times, and judgments, are associated, and kinds, forms, forces, 
causations, and concepts, are associated, and the quantitative prop-
erties are associated with the categoric properties. There is a con-
geries of associations in which all of the contents of the mind are 
associated as fast as we cognise the bodies of the universe in their 
properties and relations. 
Certain special associations of discursive thought have re-
ceived special attention and various attempts have been made to 
account for them, while the multitudinous associations of thought 
have been neglected. This partial discussion of the subject has 
led to the classification of the associations of memory; and two 
laws have been formulated: the one called the law of likeness and 
the other the law of contiguity. They have also been formulated 
as three or more; but the essential nature of association has failed 
to receive attention because the five associated properties of mat-
ter have not clearly been understood; all of these methods, about 
which scarcely two psychologists agree, have been inadequate to 
properly set forth the subject. Especially do we notice that con-
tiguity in space has been confounded with immediate succession in 
time by the habit of using a word with two meanings, and thus 
confounding succession with position. Particularly intensive asso-
ciations by which striking events are recalled, because of the deep 
effects made on the mind, have been observed by thoughtful men 
for more than twenty centuries. In moods of contemplation a 
judgment recalls some remote judgment which was startling at the 
time, and as we go on from moment to moment, recalling a multi-
tude of things by a multitude of associations, this special instance 
is thrust on the mind and we stop to consider it. I see 11 rock 
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which more or less resembles another which I once saw and now 
recall, together with an event which at that time made an impres-
sion on my mind; a man fell over the cliff. I smell the odor of 
burning brush in the wayside field and I suddenly recall the odor 
of the fire which I kindled for burning brush-piles on my father's 
farm. I taste the flavor of a nut and I recall the time when I 
threw to my shouting companions the walnuts from a wayside tree. 
Such startling revivals, often repeated, challenge attention, and 
though thoughtful men have given much attention to the phenom-
ena, it has resulted in a very imperfect psychology of association 
and symbolism. 
* 
* 
The manifestations of properties are symbols, because one be-
comes the representative of all the others in the body manifested. 
When animate beings develop the faculty of reading these sym-
bols, they are said to be able to read the expression of the emotions 
and are themselves expert in the expression of emotions. Gradually 
these expressions become more and more artificial as animals ad-
vance in culture, until at last a conventional language is devised. 
This is speech, which is practised by the lower animals, but which 
is much more highly developed in man. Natural symbolism thus 
becomes conventional symbolism, and words are signs of concepts. 
A wholly conventional symbolism is thus devised, the symbols 
being symbols of concepts. Now, men practically and overtly con-
sider their concepts and a language is a vast reservoir of conven-
tional symbols used for this purpose. There is no human language 
so crude that it does not have tens of thousands of such symbols, 
which, put together in propositions or sentences, have the power 
of expressing all the judgments which the people who use the lan-
guage are able to make. We now see the enormous development 
of ideation which man has accomplished by the invention of lan-
guage. 
A judgment is expressed in a proposition by conventional lan-
guage. Unfortunately, in grammar, subject and object have a dif-
ferent meaning from that which they have in psychology. In 
grammar the subject means that something about which an affirm-
ation is made, and the predicate means that which is affirmed of 
the subject, while object has various meanings in grammar. Until 
the terms of grammar are made to conform with the terms of psy-
chology, there must always be some confusion. Formal logic is 
the logic of grammar, and the purpose for which it was devised 
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was success in disputation. Scientific logic is the logic of kinds, 
and it is of scientific logic that we speak in this essay. The logic 
of which we speak is the logic of reasoning, not the logic of grammar. 
The methods of comparing judgments and concepts are innu-
merable, and every judgment is an act of comparison, and we are forever judging for the purposes of discovering congruities; an in-
congruous judgment acts upon a healthy mind as a moral irritant. If this and this judgment do not agree, it is an evidence of ignor-
ance and a suggestion of imbecility. There is no other motive 
that clings to man so long as the desire for wisdom. 
